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Abstract
We consider the problem of privately answering queries defined on databases which are collections
of points belonging to some metric space. We give simple, computationally efficient algorithms for
answering distance queries defined over an arbitrary metric. Distance queries are specified by points
in the metric space, and ask for the average distance from the query point to the points contained in
the database, according to the specified metric. Our algorithms run efficiently in the database size and
the dimension of the space, and operate in both the online query release setting, and the offline setting
in which they must in polynomial time generate a fixed data structure which can answer all queries of
interest. This represents one of the first subclasses of linear queries for which efficient algorithms are
known for the private query release problem, circumventing known hardness results for generic linear
queries.
1 Introduction
Consider an online retailer who is attempting to recommend products to customers as they arrive. The
retailer may have a great deal of demographic information about each customer, both from cookies and from
data obtained from tracking networks. Moreover, the retailer will also have information about what other,
demographically similar customers have purchased in the past. If the retailer can identify which cluster of
customers the new arrival most resembles, then it can likely provide a useful set of recommendations. Note
that this problem reduces to computing the average distance from the new arrival to past customers in each
demographic cluster, where the distance metric may be complex and domain specific.1
For legal reasons (i.e. to adhere to it’s stated privacy policy), or for public relations reasons, the retailer
may not want the recommendations given to some customer i to reveal information about any specific past
customer j 6= i. Therefore, it would be helpful if the retailer could compute these distance queries while
guaranteeing that these computations satisfy differential privacy. Informally, this means that the distances
computed from each new customer to the demographic clusters should be insensitive in the data of any
single user in the database of past customers.
Distance queries are a subclass of linear queries, which are well studied in the differential privacy
literature [BLR08, DNR+09, DRV10, RR10, HR10]. For example, the data analyst could answer k such
queries from an ℓ-dimensional metric space, on a database of size n using the private multiplicative weights
mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10] with error that scales as O(poly(log(k), ℓ)/√n).2 However,
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1Note that the most natural metric for this problem may not be defined by an ℓp norm, but may be something more combinatorial,
like edit distance on various categorical features.
2All of the mechanisms for answering linear queries [BLR08, DNR+09, RR10, DRV10, RR10, HR10, GHRU11, GRU12] are
defined over discrete domains X and have an error dependence on log |X|. In contrast, these queries are defined over continuous
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none of these mechanisms is computationally efficient, and even for the best of these mechanisms, the
running time per query will be exponential in ℓ, the dimension of the space. What’s more, there is strong
evidence that there do not exist computationally efficient mechanisms that can usefully and privately answer
more than O(n2) general linear queries [DNR+09, Ull12]. A major open question in differential privacy
is to determine whether there exist interesting subclasses of linear queries for which efficient algorithms do
exist.
In this paper, we show that distance queries using an arbitrary metric are one such class. We give
simple, efficient algorithms for answering exponentially many distance queries defined over any metric
space with bounded diameter. In the online query release setting, our algorithms run in time nearly linear in
the dimension of the space and the size of the private database per query. Our algorithms remain efficient
even in the offline query release setting, in which the mechanism must in one shot (and with only polynomial
running time) privately generate a synopsis which can answer all of the (possibly exponentially many)
queries of interest. This represents one of the first high dimensional classes of linear queries which are
known to have computationally efficient private query release mechanisms which can answer large numbers
of queries.
1.1 Our Techniques
At a high level, our mechanism is based on the reduction from online learning algorithms to private query
release mechanisms developed in a series of papers [RR10, HR10, GHRU11, GRU12]. Specifically, we use
the fact that an online mistake-bounded learning algorithm for learning the function F : C → R, which
maps queries f ∈ C to their answers f(D) on the private database D generically gives the existence of a
private query release mechanism in the interactive setting, where the running time per query is equal to the
update time of the learning algorithm.
We observe that when the queries are metric distance queries over some continuous ℓp metric space
X , then F : X → R is a convex, Lipschitz-continuous function. Motivated by this observation, we give
a simple mistake-bounded learning algorithm for learning arbitrary convex Lipschitz-continuous functions
over the unit interval [0, 1] by approximating F by successively finer piecewise linear approximations. Our
algorithm has a natural generalization to the ℓ-dimensional rectangle [0, 1]ℓ, but unfortunately the mistake
bound of this generalization necessarily grows exponentially with ℓ.
Instead, we observe that if X = [0, 1]ℓ, and is endowed with the ℓ1 metric, then F can be decomposed
into ℓ 1-dimensional functions F1, . . . , Fℓ each defined only over the unit interval [0, 1]. Hence, for the ℓ1
metric, our learning algorithm can be extended to [0, 1]ℓ with only a linear increase in the mistake bound.
In other words, the ℓ1 metric is an easy metric for differential privacy. In fact, for ℓ1 distance queries, our
algorithm achieves per-query error O(poly(log(k), ℓ)/n4/5), improving on the worst-case error guarantees
that would be given by inefficient generic query release mechanisms like [BLR08, HR10].
Finally, we show that our algorithm can be used to answer distance queries for any metric space that
can be embedded into poly(ℓ)-dimensional ℓ1 space using a low sensitivity embedding. A sensitivity s
embedding is one that maps any pair of databases that differ in only 1 element into a pair of projected
databases that differ in only s entries. Oblivious embeddings, such as the almost-isometric embedding from
ℓ2 into ℓ1 are 1-sensitive [FLM77, Ind06]. On the other hand, generic embeddings, such as the embedding
from an arbitrary metric space into ℓ1 that follows from Bourgain’s theorem can have sensitivity as high as
n [Bou85, LLR95].
We observe, however, that for our purposes, we do not require that the embedding preserve distances
between pairs of database points, or between pairs of query points, but rather only between database points
ℓ-dimensional domains, and so it is not clear that this previous work even applies. However, metric queries are Lipschitz, and so
these mechanisms can be run on a discrete grid with roughly nΩ(ℓ) points, giving a polynomial dependence on ℓ in the error bounds,
but an exponential dependence on ℓ in the running time.
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and query points. Therefore, we are able to prove a variant of Bourgain’s theorem, which only preserves dis-
tances between query points and database points. This gives a 1-sensitive embedding from any metric space
into log k dimensional ℓ1 space, with distortion log k, which works for any collection of k distance queries.
In particular, this gives us an efficient offline algorithm for answering k distance queries defined over an arbi-
trary bounded diameter metric that has multiplicative error O(log k) and additive error O(polylog(k)/n4/5).
Our use of metric embeddings is novel in the context of differential privacy, and we believe that they will be
useful tools for developing efficient algorithms in the future as we identify other privacy-friendly metrics in
addition to ℓ1.
1.2 Related Work
Differential privacy was developed in a series of papers [DN03, BDMN05, DMNS06], culminating in the
definition by Dwork, Mcsherry, Nissim, and Smith [DMNS06]. It is accompanied by a vast literature which
we do not attempt to survey.
Dwork et al. [DMNS06] also introduced the Laplace mechanism, which together with the composition
theorems of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10] gives an efficient, interactive method for privately
answering nearly n2 arbitrary low-sensitivity queries on a database of size n to non-trivial accuracy. On
the other hand, it has been known since Blum, Ligett, and Roth [BLR08] that it is information theoreti-
cally possible to privately answer nearly exponentially many linear queries to non-trivial accuracy, but the
mechanism of [BLR08] is not computationally efficient. A series of papers [BLR08, DNR+09, DRV10,
RR10, HR10, GHRU11, GRU12] has extended the work of [BLR08], improving its accuracy, running time,
and generality. The state of the art is the private multiplicative weights mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum
[HR10]. However, even this mechanism has running time that is linear in the size of the data universe, or in
other words exponential in the dimension of the data. Finding algorithms which can achieve error bounds
similar to [BLR08, HR10] while running in time only polynomial in the size of the database and the data
dimension has been a major open question in the differential privacy literature since at least [BLR08], who
explicitly ask this question.
Unfortunately, a striking recent result of Ullman [Ull12], building on the beautiful work of Dwork, Naor,
Reingold, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DNR+09], shows that assuming the existence of one way functions,
no polynomial time algorithm can answer more than O(n2) arbitrary linear queries. In other words, the
Laplace mechanism of [DMNS06] is nearly optimal among all computationally efficient algorithms for
privately answering queries at a comparable level of generality. This result suggests that to make progress
on the problem of computationally efficient private query release, we must abandon the goal of designing
mechanisms which can answer arbitrary linear queries, and instead focus on classes of queries that have
some particular structure that we can exploit.
Before this work, there were very few efficient algorithms for privately releasing classes of “high di-
mensional” linear queries with worst case error guarantees. Blum, Ligett, and Roth [BLR08] gave efficient
algorithms for two low dimensional classes of queries: constant dimensional axis aligned rectangles, and
large margin halfspaces3 . Feldman et al. gave efficient algorithms for releasing Euclidean k-medians queries
in a constant dimensional unit ball [FFKN09]. Note that when we restrict our attention to Euclidean metric
spaces, our queries correspond to 1-median queries. In contrast to [FFKN09], we can handle arbitrary met-
rics, and our algorithms are efficient also in the dimension of the metric space. Blum and Roth [BR11] gave
an efficient algorithm for releasing linear queries defined over predicates with extremely sparse truth tables,
but such queries are very rare. Only slightly more is known for average case error. Gupta et al. [GHRU11]
gave a polynomial time algorithm for releasing the answers (to linear, but non-trivial error) to conjunctions,
3Note that halfspace queries are in general high dimensional, but the large-margin assumption implies that the data has intrinsic
dimension only roughly O(log n), since the dimensionality of the data can be reduced using the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma
without affecting the value of any of the halfspace predicates.
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where the error is measured in the average case on conjunctions drawn from a product distribution. Hardt,
Rothblum, and Servedio [HRS12] gave a polynomial time algorithm for releasing answers to parity queries,
where the error is measured in the average case on parities drawn from a product distribution. Although it is
known how to convert average case error to worst-case error using the private boosting technique of Dwork,
Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10], the boosting algorithm itself is not computationally efficient when the
class of queries is large, and so cannot be applied in this setting where we are interested in polynomial time
algorithms. For the special case of privately releasing conjunctions in ℓ dimensions, Thaler, Ullman, and
Vadhan [TUV12], building on the work of Hardt, Rothblum, and Servedio [HRS12], give an algorithm that
runs in time O(2
√
ℓ), improving on the generic bound of O(2ℓ). Finding a polynomial time algorithm for
releasing conjunctions remains an open problem.
Metric embeddings have proven to be a useful technique in theoretical computer science, particularly
when designing approximation algorithms. See [Ind01] for a useful survey. The specific embeddings
that we use in this paper are the nearly isometric embedding from ℓ2 into ℓ1 using random projections
[FLM77, Ind06], and a variant of Bourgain’s theorem [Bou85, LLR95], which allows the embedding of an
arbitrary metric into ℓ1. Our use of metric embeddings is slightly different than its typical use in approxi-
mation algorithms. Typically, metric embeddings are used to embed some problem into a metric in which
some optimization problem of interest is tractable. In our case, we are embedding metrics into ℓ1, for which
the information theoretic problem of query release is simpler, since a d dimensional ℓ1 metric can be de-
composed into d 1-dimensional metric spaces. On the one hand, for privacy, we have a stronger constraint
on the type of metric embeddings we can employ: we require them to be low sensitivity embeddings, which
map neighboring databases to databases of bounded distance (in the hamming metric). The embedding cor-
responding to Bourgain’s theorem does not satisfy this property. On the other hand, we do not require that
the embedding preserve the distances between pairs of database points, or pairs of query points, but merely
between query points and database points. This allows us to prove a variant of Bourgain’s theorem that is
1-sensitive. We think that metric embeddings may prove to be a useful tool in the design of efficient private
query release algorithms, and in particular, identifying other privacy friendly metrics, and the study of other
low sensitivity embeddings is a very interesting future direction.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Let (X , d) be an arbitrary metric space. Let D ∈ X n be a database consists of n points in the metric space.
For the sake of presentation, we will focus on metric spaces with diameter 1 through out the main body of
this paper. This is simply a matter of scaling: all of our error bounds hold for arbitrary diameter spaces, with
a linear dependence on the diameter.
We will consider the problem of releasing distance queries while preserving the privacy of the elements
in the database, where each query is a point y ∈ X in the metric space and the answer for a given query y is
the average distance from y to the elements in the database, i.e.,
∑
x∈D
1
nd(x, y). Let Q ∈ X k be the set of
distance queries asked by the data analyst. We will let D(Q) ∈ Rk denote the exact answer to the queries Q
with respect to database D. We will usually use xi’s to denote data points and yj’s to denote query points.
Query Release Mechanisms We will consider two settings for query release in this paper: The first setting
is the interactive setting, where the queries are not given upfront but instead arrive online. An interactive
query release mechanism needs to provide an answer for each query as it arrives. The answer can depend
on the query, the private database, and the state of the mechanism, but not on future queries. An interactive
query release mechanism is said to be efficient if the per-query running time is polynomial in the database
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size n and the dimension of the metric space ℓ.
The second setting is the non-interactive setting. A non-interactive query release mechanism takes the
database as input and outputs an algorithm that can answer all queries without further access to the database.
We say an offline query release mechanism is efficient if both the running time of the mechanism and the
running time per query of the algorithm it constructs are polynomial in n and ℓ.
2.2 Differential Privacy
We let ‖D1 − D2‖H denote the hamming distance between two databases D1 and D2. Two databases are
adjacent if the hamming distance between them is at most 1 (i.e. they differ in a single element). We will
write n = |D| to denote the size of the database. We will consider the by now standard privacy solution
concept of “differential privacy” [DMNS06].
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy). A mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all adjacent
databases D1 and D2, any set of queries Q, and for all subsets of possible answers S ⊂ Rk, we have
Pr [M(D1,Q) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr [M(D2,Q) ∈ S] + δ .
If δ = 0, then we say that M is ǫ-differentially private.
A function f : X n → R is said to have sensitivity ∆ with respect to the private database if maxD1,D2 |f(D1)−
f(D2)| ≤ ∆, where the max is taken over all pairs of adjacent databases.
When we talk about the privacy of interactive mechanisms, the range of the mechanism is considered to
be the entire transcript of queries and answers communicated between the data analyst and the mechanism
(see [DRV10, HR10] for a more precise formalization of the model). An interactive mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-
differential private if the probability that the transcript falls into any chosen subset differs by at most an
exp(ǫ) multiplicative factor and a δ additive factor for any two adjacent databases.
Given a mechanism, we will measure its accuracy in terms of answering distance queries as follows.
Definition 2 (Accuracy). A mechanism M is (α, β)-accurate if for any database D and any set of queries
Q, with probability at least 1− β, the mechanism answers every query up to an additive error α, i.e.,
Pr [‖M(D,Q) −D(Q)‖∞ ≤ α] ≥ 1− β .
3 Releasing ℓ1-Distance Queries
In this section, we consider ℓ1 distance queries, i.e., we let X ⊂ [0, 1]ℓ and d = ‖.‖1 such that the diameter
of X (with respect to ℓ1) is 1. We present private, computationally efficient mechanisms for releasing the
answers to ℓ1 distance queries in both the interactive and offline setting. These mechanisms for releasing ℓ1
distances will serve as important building blocks for our results for other metrics. First, let us formally state
our result in the interactive setting:
Theorem 1. There is an interactive (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism for releasing answers to distance
queries with respect to (X , ‖.‖1) that is (α, β)-accurate with α satisfying
α = O
(
ℓ9/5 log4/5(4/δ) log4/5(k/β)
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
.
There is also an interactive ǫ-differentially private mechanism for releasing distance queries with respect
to (X , ‖.‖1) that is (α, β)-accurate for α satisfying
α = O
(
ℓ7/3 log2/3(k/β)
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
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The per-query running times of both mechanisms is O(ℓn) per query.
As an extension of the above theorem, we also get the following result in the offline setting.
Theorem 2. There is a poly-time (ǫ, δ)-differentially private offline mechanism that is (α, β)-accurate for
releasing distance queries with respect to (X , ‖.‖1), for α satisfying
α = O
(
ℓ9/5 log4/5(4/δ) log4/5(nℓ/β)
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
.
There is a poly-time ǫ-differentially private offline mechanism that is (α, β)-accurate for releasing distance
queries with respect to (X , ‖.‖1), for α satisfying
α = O
(
ℓ7/3 log2/3(nℓ/β)
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
The total running time of this mechanism is O
(
ℓ3n2
α
)
.
Remark 2.1. Note that the offline mechanism has no dependence on the number of queries asked, in either
the accuracy or the running time. It in one shot produces a data structure that can be used to accurately
answer all ℓ1 queries.
Proof Overview To prove Theorem 1, we will use the connection between private query release and online
learning, which was established in [RR10, HR10, GRU12, JT12]. We will briefly review this connection
in Section 3.1. Based on this connection, it suffices to provide an online learning algorithm that learns the
function mapping queries to their answers with respect to the database using a small number of updates.
Next, we will shift our viewpoint by interpreting each database as a 1-Lipschitz and convex function that
maps the query points to real values between [0, 1]. The structure of the ℓ1 metric allows us to reduce the
problem to learning ℓ different one dimensional 1-Lipschitz and convex functions, for which we propose in
Section 3.2 an online learning algorithm that only requires O(α−1/2) updates to achieve an additive error
bound α. Finally, we combine these ingredients to give an interactive differentially private mechanism
for releasing answers for ℓ1 distance queries in Section 3.3 and complete the proof of Theorem 1. Roughly
speaking, the interactive mechanism will always maintain a hypothesis function that maps queries to answers
and it will update the hypothesis function using the online learning algorithm whenever the hypothesis
function makes a mistake. Finally, we show that there is an explicit set of O(ℓ2/α) queries such that asking
these queries to the interactive mechanism is sufficient to guarantee that the hypothesis function is accurate
with respect to all queries. So Theorem 2 follows because the offline mechanism can first ask these queries
to the interactive mechanism and then release the hypothesis function.
3.1 Query Release from Iterative Database Construction
In this section, we give a (variant) of the definition of the iterative construction framework defined in
[GRU12], generalizing the median mechanism and the multiplicative weights mechanism [RR10, HR10].
Let FC : C → R be the function such that for each y ∈ C , FC(y) = D(y): i.e. F maps queries to their
answers evaluated on D. Note that FC(y) is a 1/n sensitive function in the private database. The variant
of the definition of Iterative Database Construction that we give allows the learning algorithm to also learn
the answers to some set S of O(1/n) sensitive functions on FC as well (in addition to just FC(y)). In our
application, S will consist of queries about the derivative of FC , where in our case, FC will be a (one-sided)
differentiable function.
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Definition 3 ([RR10, HR10, GRU12]). Let FC : C → R be the function such that for each y ∈ C ,
FC(y) = D(y): i.e. F maps queries to their answers evaluated on D. Let S = {f1, . . . , f|S|} be a
collection of functions fi : X ×D → R that are each O(1/n) sensitive in the private database D. Given an
error bound α > 0 and an error tolerance c, an iterative database construction algorithm using functions S
with respect to a class of queries C plays the following game with an adversary:
1. The algorithm maintains a hypothesis function Fˆt : C → R on which it can evaluate queries, which
is initialized to be some default function Fˆ0 at step 0.
2. In each step t ≥ 1, the adversary (adaptively) chooses a query yt ∈ X , at which point the algorithm
predicts a query value Fˆt(yt). If |Fˆt(yt)−FC(yt)| > α, then we say the algorithm has made a mistake.
At this point, the algorithm receives |S| values a1, . . . , a|S| ∈ R such that for all i: ai ∈ [fi(yt,D)−
cα, fi(yt,D) + cα]. The algorithm may update its hypothesis function using this information.
Definition 4 (Mistake Bound). An iterative database construction algorithm has a mistake bound m :
R+ 7→ N+, if for any given error bound α, no adversary can (adaptively) choose a sequence of queries to
force the algorithm to make m(α) + 1 mistakes.
Lemma 3 ([RR10, HR10, GRU12]). If there is an iterative database construction using functions S for
releasing a query class C with mistake bound m(α) with respect to some error tolerance c, then there is
an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism in the interactive setting that is (α, β)-accurate for answering
queries C , for α satisfying
cα =
1
nǫ
3000
√
|S|m(α) log(4/δ) log(k/β) .
There is also an ǫ-differentially private mechanism in the interactive setting that is (α, β)-accurate, for α
satisfying
cα =
1
nǫ
3000 |S| ·m(α) log(k/β) .
Moreover, the per-query running time of the query release mechanism is equal to (up to constant factors)
the running time of the per-round running time of the iterative database construction algorithm.
Representing ℓ1 Databases as Decomposable Convex Functions Consider a database D where the uni-
verse is the ℓ-dimensional unit cube X = [0, 1]ℓ endowed with the ℓ1 metric. In this setting, the function
mapping queries y ∈ X to their answers takes the form: FD(y) = 1n
∑
x∈D ||x − y||1, which is a 1/n-
Lipschitz convex function of y. We wish to proceed by providing an iterative database construction for ℓ1
distance queries using these properties. Observe that because we are working with the ℓ1 metric, we can
write: FD(y) =
∑ℓ
i=1 F
(i)
D (y), where F
(i)
D (y) =
1
n
∑
x∈D |xi − yi|. Observe that each function F (i)D (y) is
1-Lipschitz and convex, and has a 1-dimensional range [0, 1]. Therefore, to learn an approximation to FD(y)
up to some error α, it suffices to learn an approximation to each F (i)D (y) to error α/ℓ. This is the approach
we take.
3.2 Learning 1-Lipschitz Convex Functions
In this section we study the problem of iteratively constructing an arbitrary continuous, 1-Lipschitz, and
convex function G : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] up to some additive error α1 with noisy oracle access to the function.
Here, the oracle can return the function value G(x) and the derivative G′(x) given any x ∈ [0, 1] up to an
additive error of α1/4. Here, we assume the derivative G′ is well defined in [0, 1]: If G is not differentiable
at x, then we assume the derivative G′(x) is (consistently) defined to be any value between the left and right
derivatives at x.
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Learning a 1-Lipschitz and Convex Function
Maintain Gˆ(x) = maxk{ak · x+ bk} where ak ∈ [−1, 1] and bk ∈ R define a set of linear functions.
Initial Step: Let a0 = 0 and b0 = 0.
Update Step t ≥ 1: While the update generator returns a distinguishing point x∗t , we shall add the
tangent line at x∗t with respect to function g to the set of linear functions, i.e., at = G′(x∗t ) and bt =
G(x∗t )−G(x∗t )′ · x∗t .
Figure 1: An algorithm for learning a 1-Lipschitz and convex one-dimensional function by approximating it
with a piece-wise linear function. The algorithm always predicts according to Gˆ. When it makes a mistake,
it is given an update point x∗t together with G(x∗t ) and G(x∗t )′.
We will first present an algorithm that learns any one-dimension 1-Lipschitz and convex function using
an exact oracle. Then, we will explain why this algorithm is in fact noise-tolerant. Finally, we show that this
result naturally extends to multi-dimensional decomposable functions.
Learning 1-D Functions with an Accurate Oracle We will consider maintaining a hypothesis piece-wise
linear function Gˆ(x) via the algorithm given in Figure 1. We will analyze the number of updates needed by
this algorithm before it has learned a piece-wise linear function Gˆ that approximates G everywhere up to
additive error α1.
First, for any 1-Lipschitz (possibly non-convex) function G and any given error bound α1 > 0, the algo-
rithm in Figure 1 will make at most 1/α1 mistakes. This is because the function being 1-Lipschitz implies
that the tangent line at each update point x∗t is a good approximation (up to error α1) in the neighborhood
[x∗t − α1, x∗t + α1], and hence any pair of update points are at least α1 away from each other. Further, it is
easy to construct examples where this bound is tight up to a constant.
Next, we will show that using the convexity of function G, we can improve the mistake bound to
O( 1√α1 ).
Lemma 4. For any 1-Lipschitz convex function G and any given error bound α1 ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm in
Figure 1 will make at most 3√α1 updates.
Proof. Consider any two update points x∗t and x∗t′ . Let us assume w.l.o.g. that t < t′. Then, by our
assumption, the tangent line at x∗t does not approximate the function value of f at x∗t′ up to an additive error
of α. Therefore, we get that
α1 < G(x
∗
t′)−
(
G′(x∗t )(x
∗
t′ − x∗t ) +G(x∗t )
)
= G(x∗t′)−G(x∗t )−G′(x∗t )(x∗t′ − x∗t )
≤ G′(x∗t′)(x∗t′ − x∗t )−G′(x∗t )(x∗t′ − x∗t )
= (G′(x∗t′)−G′(x∗t ))(x∗t′ − x∗t ) , (1)
where the second inequality is by the convexity of f .
Next, consider a maximal set of update points in sorted order: −1 ≤ xˆ1 < · · · < xˆT ≤ 1. Since G is
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convex and 1-Lipschitz, we have that −1 ≤ G′(xˆ1) < · · · < G′(xˆT ) ≤ 1. Therefore, we get that
2 · 1 ≥ (G′(xˆT )−G′(xˆ1))(xˆT − xˆ1)
=
∑T−1
t=1 (G
′(xˆt+1)−G′(xˆt))
∑T−1
i=1 (xˆt+1 − xˆt)
≥
(∑T−1
t=1
√
(G′(xˆt+1)−G′(xˆt))(xˆt+1 − xˆt)
)2
≥
(∑T−1
t=1
√
α1
)2
.
Here, the first inequality is by G′(xt) ∈ [−1, 1] and xt ∈ [0, 1] for t = 1, . . . , T ; the second inequality is a
simple application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality; the last inequality is by equation (1). So by the above
inequality, the number of mistakes is at most T ≤
√
2√
α1
+ 1 < 3√α1 .
Learning 1-D Functions with a Noisy Oracle Note that the domain of the function is [0, 1]. So if the
tangent line at x′ approximates the function value at x up to additive error α12 , i.e.,
G(x)−G(x′) +G′(x′)(x− x′) ≤ α1
2
,
then a noisy version of the tangent line G¯(x′) + G¯′(x′)(x − x′), where G¯(x′) ∈ [G(x′) − α14 , G(x′) + α14 ]
and G¯′(x′) ∈ [G′(x′) − α14 , G′(x′) + α14 ], will approximate the value at x up to additive error α1. Hence,
the mistake bound of the algorithm in Figure 1 for learning a 1-Lipschitz and convex function up to additive
error α1 using a noisy oracle is no more than the mistake bound for learning the same function up to additive
error α12 with an accurate oracle. Hence, the mistake bound is still of order O(
1√
α1
).
Lemma 5. For any 1-Lipschitz convex function g and any given error bound α1 ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm in
Figure 1 will make at most O( 1√α1 ) updates with an
α1
4 -noisy oracle.
Learning Decomposable Functions Suppose we want to learn an ℓ-dimension decomposable convex
function FD =
∑ℓ
i=1 F
(i)
D up to additive error α, where each F
(i)
D is convex and 1-Lipschitz. Then, it
suffices to learn the 1-Lipschitz convex functions F (i)D for each coordinate up to error α1 =
α
ℓ . So as a
simple corollary of Lemma 5, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 6. For any function FD : [0, 1]ℓ → R such that:
1. FD(y) =
∑ℓ
i=1 F
(i)
D (yi) where each F
(i)
D : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is 1-Lipschitz and convex, and:
2. For every y ∈ [0, 1]ℓ and every i ∈ [ℓ]: F (i)D (y) and (F (i)D (y))′ are 1/n-sensitive in D
there is an iterative database construction algorithm for FD using a collection of 2ℓ functions S with respect
to an error tolerance 1/(4ℓ) that has a mistake bound of m(α) = O(ℓ3/2/α1/2).
Proof. Let α1 = αℓ . Consider the following algorithm:
1. The algorithm maintains a hypothesis function Fˆt =
∑ℓ
i=1 Fˆ
(i)
t by maintaining ℓ one-dimension
piecewise-linear hypothesis functions Fˆ (i)t : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] for each i ∈ [ℓ] via the one-dimension
learning algorithm with error tolerance α1, and letting Fˆt =
∑ℓ
i=1 Fˆ
(i)
t .
2. If the algorithm makes a mistake on query yt ∈ [0, 1]ℓ, then the algorithm asks query yt to each of the
one-dimensional learning algorithms. On any of the one-dimensional learning algorithms i on which a
mistake is made, the algorithm queries two values: F (i)t (yti) and (F
(i)
t )
′(yti), tolerating additive error
up to α1/(4), and updates the hypothesis Fˆ (i)t , i = 1, . . . , ℓ, accordingly using the one dimensional
learning algorithm. Note that this leads to at most |S| = 2ℓ queries per update.
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Note that whenever the above algorithm makes a mistake, at least one of the one-dimensional algorithms
must also make a mistake (since otherwise the total error was at most ℓα1 = α), and therefore we can
charge this mistake to the mistake bound of at least one of the one-dimensional learning algorithms. By
Lemma 5, the number of times that the hypothesis function Fˆ (i)t in each coordinate admits additive error at
least α1 is at most O(1/
√
α1). So the above iterative database construction algorithm has mistake bound
O(ℓ/
√
α1) = O(ℓ
3/2/α1/2).
3.3 Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Since the ℓ1 distance function in each coordinate has range [0, 1] and is 1-Lipschitz, we
get that F (i)t and the derivative (F
(i)
t )
′ are O(1/n)-sensitive. So by Lemma 6, there is an iterative database
construction algorithm for releasing answers to ℓ1 distance queries that uses a set S of 2ℓ O(1/n)-sensitive
queries with error α1, and the algorithm has mistake bound O(ℓ3/2/α1/2).
By plugging the parameters of the above iterative database construction algorithm to Lemma 3, we get
that there is an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism in the interactive setting that is (α, β)-accurate for
releasing distance queries with respect to metric space ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖1), for α satisfying
α
ℓ
= O

 1
nǫ
√
ℓ5/2
α1/2
log(4/δ) log(k/β)

 .
Solving the above we get that
α = O
(
ℓ9/5 log4/5(4/δ) log4/5(k/β)
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
.
We also get that there is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism in the interactive setting that is (α, β)-
accurate, for α satisfying
α
ℓ
= O
(
1
nǫ
ℓ5/2
α1/2
log(k/β)
)
.
Solving the above we get that
α = O
(
ℓ7/3 log2/3(4/δ) log2/3(k/β)
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
The analysis of the running time per query is straightforward and hence omitted.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider running the online query release mechanism with accuracy α′ = α/2. To
give an offline mechanism, we simply describe a fixed set of ℓ/α′ queries that we can make to each of the
ℓ one-dimensional learning algorithms maintaining Fˆ (i)D that guarantees that for each y ∈ [0, 1], |Fˆ (i)D (y)−
F
(i)
D (y)| ≤ α/ℓ Once we have this condition, we know that for each y ∈ [0, 1]ℓ: |FˆD(y) − FD(y)| ≤ α.
The queries are simple: we just take our query set to be a grid: T = {0, α′/ℓ, 2α′/ℓ, 3α′/ℓ, . . . , 1}.By the
guarantees of the 1-dimensional learning algorithm, we have that for every y ∈ T , |Fˆ (i)D (y) − F (i)D (y)| ≤
α′/ℓ. Moreover, by the fact that Fˆ (i)D is 1-Lipschitz, and for every y ∈ [0, 1], d(y, T ) ≤ α′/ℓ, we have that
for every y ∈ [0, 1], |Fˆ (i)D (y) − F (i)D (y)| ≤ 2α′/ℓ = α/ℓ, which is the condition we wanted. In total, we
make 2ℓ2/α queries, and the theorem follows by instantiating the guarantees of the online mechanism with
k = 2ℓ2/α.
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Releasing distance queries via embedding into ℓ1
Input: A set of data points D. A set of queries points Q. A 1-sensitive embedding π from (X , d) to
([0, 1]ℓ, ‖ · ‖1).
1. Construct a proxy database D′ for releasing ℓ1 distances by letting π(x) ∈ D′ for every x ∈ D.
2. Use the (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism (resp., ǫ-differentially private mechanism) for re-
leasing ℓ1 distances queries to answer 1n
∑
x∈D ‖π(x) − π(y)‖1 for every y ∈ Q and release them
as the answers to 1n
∑
x∈D d(x, y) respectively.
Figure 2: An (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism Mǫ,δ (resp., ǫ-differentially private mechanism Mǫ) for
releasing distance queries via embedding into ℓ1
4 Releasing Arbitrary Distance Queries via 1-Sensitive Metric Embeddings
In this section, we will discuss how to release answers to distance queries with respect to other metric spaces.
Our approach is to reduce the problem to releasing answers to ℓ1 distance queries via metric embeddings.
Recall that an embedding from a metric space (X , d) to another metric space (Y, d′) is a mapping π : X 7→
Y . The usefulness of an embedding is measured by how much the embedding distorts the distance between
any pair of points.
Note that for the purpose of answering distance queries, the usual definition of distortion is too strong
in the sense that the usual notion of distortion considers the worst case distortion for every pair of points
in the metric space while we only need to preserve the distances between every data-query pair. So in this
paper, we will consider the following weaker notion of expansion, contraction, and distortion of metric
embeddings.
Definition 5. Recall that (X , d) is the metric space of the distance query release problem and D and Q are
the set of data points and the set of query points respectively. The expansion of an embedding π from (X , d)
to another metric space (Y, d′) is
max
x∈X ,y∈Q
d′(π(x), π(y))
d(x, y)
.
The contraction of the embedding is
max
x∈X ,y∈Q
d(x, y)
d′(π(x), π(y))
.
The distortion of the embedding is the product of its expansion and contraction.
In the rest of this section, we will choose the target metric (Y, d′) to be the ℓ1 metric space ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖1)
and we will always scale the embedding such that the expansion is 1.
4.1 1-Sensitive Metric Embeddings
Suppose we are given such an embedding from (X , d) to ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖1) with expansion 1 and contraction C .
In some cases, the dimension ℓ of the target ℓ1 space may depend on the contraction C . We will embed both
the data points and the query points into ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖1) and release distance queries via the the mechanism
for ℓ1. Concretely, consider the mechanisms Mǫ,δ and Mǫ given in Figure 2.
Let us first consider the accuracy of these mechanisms. The mechanisms will lose a multiplicative factor
due to the embedding and an additive factor due to answering the ℓ1 queries privately. More precisely,
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Theorem 7. If the embedding π has expansion 1 and contraction C , and if we use the (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private mechanism to release answers for ℓ1 distance queries, then with probability at least 1 − β the
mechanism Mǫ,δ answers every distance query y ∈ Q with accuracy
1
C
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) − αǫ,δ ≤Mǫ,δ(y,D) ≤
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) + αǫ,δ ,
where αǫ,δ = O˜
(
ℓ9/5
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
. If we use the ǫ-differentially private mechanism to release answers for ℓ1 dis-
tance queries, then with probability at least 1 − β the mechanism Aǫ answers every query y ∈ Q with
accuracy
1
C
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) − αǫ ≤ Aǫ(D, y) ≤
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) + αǫ ,
where αǫ = O
(
ℓ7/3
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
Remark 7.1. If the embedding is nearly isometric, i.e., we can achieve contraction 1 + α for any small
α > 0 by embedding in to an ℓ(α)-dimension ℓ1 space, then we will choose the optimal additive error
bound such that
αǫ,δ = O˜
(
ℓ(αǫ,δ)
9/5
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
.
and
αǫ = O˜
(
ℓ(αǫ)
7/3
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
Proof. Let us prove the error bound for ǫ-differential privacy. The proof of the error bound for (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy is similar. We will view the embedding π as from (X, d) to (π(X), ‖.‖1). Since the em-
bedding π has expansion 1, the image π(X) of X has diameter 1 as well. LetM ℓ1ǫ denote the ǫ-differentially
private mechanism for releasing answers to the ℓ1 distance queries. Then we have that
Mǫ(y,D) = M
ℓ1
ǫ (π(y),D
′)
≤
∑
x∈D
‖π(x)− π(y)‖1 + O˜
(
ℓ7/3
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
≤
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) + O˜
(
ℓ7/3
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
The proof of the lower bound is similar, hence omitted.
Next we will turn to the privacy guarantee of the mechanism. Since we are using either an (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private mechanism or an ǫ-differentially private mechanism for releasing answers to the ℓ1
distance queries with respect to the proxy database D′, it suffices to ensure that the embeddings of neigh-
boring databases remain neighboring databases. In general, the embedding of some point x may be defined
in terms of other data points y, which would violate this condition. Formally, we want our embeddings to
be 1-sensitive:
Definition 6. An embedding π from (X , d) to ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖1) is 1-sensitive if changing a data point xi ∈ D
will only change the embedding π(xi) of xi and will not affect the embedding π(xj) of other xj ∈ D for any
j 6= i.
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Theorem 8. If the embedding π is 1-sensitive, and if we use the (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism
(resp., ǫ-differentially private mechanism) for releasing answers to the ℓ1 distance queries, then the mecha-
nism Mǫ,δ (resp., Mǫ) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private (resp., ǫ-differentially private).
Proof. For any two neighboring databases D1 and D2, the resulting proxy databases D′1 and D′2 in Figure
2 will either be the same or be neighboring databases since the embedding π is 1-sensitive. Since we are
using an ǫ-differentially private mechanism for releasing ℓ1 distances over the proxy databases, we get that
for any set of queries Q and for any subset S of possible answers,
Pr[Mǫ(D1,Q) ∈ S] = Pr[M ℓ1ǫ (D′1, π(Q)) ∈ S]
≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[M ℓ1ǫ (D′2, π(Q)) ∈ S]
= Pr[Mǫ(D2,Q) ∈ S] .
So mechanism Mǫ is ǫ-differentially private. The proof for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is similar and hence
omitted.
Remark 8.1. In principle, we can also consider s-sensitive embeddings for small s. However, we are not
aware of any useful embeddings of this kind. So we will focus on 1-sensitive embeddings in this paper.
Remark 8.2. If the embedding π is independent of the setQ of queries, then the mechanisms in Figure 2 can
be made interactive or non-interactive by using the interactive or non-interactive mechanisms respectively
for releasing answers to the ℓ1 distance queries. If the embedding is a function of the query set, then the
mechanism will be non-interactive, because potentially all of the queries may be needed to construct the
embedding of the database.
4.2 Releasing Euclidean Distance via an Oblivious Embedding
Let us consider releasing distance queries with respect to Euclidean distance. From the metric embedding
literature we know that there exists an almost isometric embedding from ℓ2 to ℓ1. More precisely,
Lemma 9 (E.g., [FLM77, Ind06]). There is an embedding π from ([0, 1]ℓ, ‖.‖2) to ([0, 1]ℓ′ , ‖.‖1) with ex-
pansion 1, contraction 1 + α, and ℓ′ = O
(
ℓ log(1/α)
α2
)
. Further, this embedding can be probabilistically
constructed in polynomial time by defining each coordinate as a random projection.
Since the above embedding is based on random projections, it is 1-sensitive and independent of the set
Q of queries. Thus we can plug this embedding into our framework in Figure 2 and the following theorem
for releasing Euclidean distances follows from Theorem 7, Remark 7.1, Theorem 8, and Remark 8.2.
Theorem 10. Suppose (X , ‖.‖2) is a subspace of the ℓ2 space with diameter 1. Then, there are polynomial
time interactive and non-interactive mechanisms for releasing answers to the ℓ2 distance queries that are
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private and (αǫ,δ, β)-accurate for αǫ,δ satisfying
αǫ,δ = O˜
(
ℓ9/23
n4/23ǫ4/23
)
.
There are also polynomial time interactive and non-interactive mechanisms for releasing answers to the ℓ2
distance queries that are ǫ-differentially private and (αǫ, β)-accurate for αǫ satisfying
αǫ = O˜
(
ℓ7/17
n2/17ǫ2/17
)
.
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1-sensitive variant of Bourgain: Embedding an arbitrary metic space (X, d) into ℓ1
Pre-processing: For 1 ≤ i ≤ log k and 1 ≤ j ≤ K , where K is chosen to be 512(log k+ log n), choose
a random subset Sij of the query points by picking each query point y independently with probability
2−(i−1).
Embedding: Given x in the metric space (X, d), embed it into {πij(x)}0≤i≤log k,1≤j≤K in the
O(K log k)-dimension ℓ1 space by letting πij(x) = 1K log kd(x, Sij).
Figure 3: A randomized 1-sensitive embedding of an arbitrary metric space (X, d) into an O(log2 k +
log k log n)-dimension ℓ1 space with O(log k) distortion
The omitted poly-log factors depends on ℓ, n, and β−1 (and δ−1 for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy) in the offline
setting. In the interactive setting, this factor also depends on log k. We remark again that in the offline
setting, the constructed data structure can answer all ℓ2 queries.
We remark that Lemma 9 also holds for ℓp metrics for p ∈ (1, 2) (E.g., [FLM77]). So the results stated
in Theorem 10 also apply to ℓp metrices for p ∈ (1, 2). Details are omitted.
4.3 Releasing Distances for General Metric via Bourgain’s Theorem
In this section, we will consider releasing distance queries with respect to an arbitrary metric (X , d) by
embedding it into an ℓ1 metric. Bourgain’s theorem (e.g., [Bou85, LLR95]) suggests that for any m points
in the metric space, there is an embedding into anO(log2m)-dimensional ℓ1 space with distortion O(logm).
Unfortunately, this embedding is not oblivious and does not have low sensitivity. However, recall that for the
purpose of releasing distance queries, we only need to preserve the distances between all data-query pairs.
In other words, it is okay to have the distances between data points (and likewise, between query points)
to be highly distorted. Further, we show that for this weaker notion of embedding, there is a variation of
Bourgain’s theorem using an embedding that is oblivious to the data points, and hence has sensitivity 1.
Concretely, we will consider the embedding given in Figure 3. The idea is to define the embedding only
using the query points and we will show this is enough to preserve the distances from any point in the metric
space to the query points with high probability. Formally, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 11 (1-Sensitive Variant of Bourgain). In the embedding given in Figure 3, for any data point
x ∈ X and any query point y ∈ Q, with probability at least 1− 1n2k , we have
1
64 log k
d(x, y) ≤ ‖π(x)− π(y)‖1 ≤ d(x, y) .
The proof of the above theorem is very similar to one of the proofs for Bourgain’s original theorem. The
expansion bound is identical. The contraction bound will only guarantee the embedded distance of two pair
of points x ∈ D and y ∈ Q satisfies d′(π(x), π(y)) ≥ O( 1log k )(d(x, y) − d(x,Q)). We observe that the
additive loss of O( 1log k )d(x,Q) can be avoided by using an additional O(log k + log n) dimensions in the
embedding. We include the proof below for completeness.
Proof. Expansion: By triangle inequality, |πij(x)−πij(y)| = 1K log k |d(x, Sij)−d(y, Sij)| ≤ 1K log kd(x, y).
Summing over 0 ≤ i ≤ log k and 1 ≤ j ≤ K we have∑log ki=0 ∑Kj=1 |πij(x)− πij(y)| ≤ d(x, y).
Contraction: Let us first define some notation. Let ri and r′i denote the smallest radius such that the closed
ball (with respect to metric (X, d), similar hereafter) B(x, ri) and B(y, r′i) respectively contains at least
14
2i−1 query points. Let r∗i = max{ri, r′i}. We will have that r∗i is non-decreasing in i. Let i′ denote the
largest index such that r∗i′ + r∗i′−1 ≤ d(x, y). Redefine r∗i′ to be d(x, y) − r∗i′−1. We have r∗i′ ≥ d(x,y)2 . We
will need to following lemmas.
Lemma 12. For any 1 < i ≤ i′, we have∑Kj=1 |πij(x)− πij(y)| ≥ 132 log k (r∗i − r∗i−1) with probability at
least 1− 1
n2k log k
.
Proof. Suppose r∗i = ri (the other case is similar). Consider the open ball Bo(x, r∗i ) and the closed ball
B(y, r∗i−1). By definition, the number of query points in Bo(x, r∗i ) is less than 2i−1, and the number query
points in B(y, r∗i−1) is at least 2i−2. Since for each 1 ≤ j ≤ K , the set Sij pick each query point indepen-
dently with probability 2−(i−1), the probability that Sij ∩ Bo(x, r∗i ) = ∅ is at least (1 − 2−(i−1))2
i−1 ≥ 14 ,
while the probability that Sij ∩ B(y, r∗i−1) 6= ∅ is at least 1 − (1 − 2−(i−1))2
i−2 ≥ 1 − e− 12 . In sum, with
probability at least 14 (1 − e−
1
2 ) > 116 , we have both Sij ∩ Bo(x, r∗i ) = ∅ and Sij ∩ B(y, r∗i−1) 6= ∅, which
indicates that d(x, Sij) ≥ r∗i and d(y, Sij) ≤ r∗i−1 and therefore
|πij(x)− πij(y)| ≥ 1
K log k
(r∗i − r∗i−1) . (2)
Further, by the additive form of Chernoff-Hoeffding theorem, we get that with probability at least 1−2−K64 <
1 − 1
n2k log k
, (2) holds for at least K32 i’s. So we conclude that with probability at least 1 − 1n2k log k ,∑K
j=1 |πij(x)− πij(y)| ≥ 132 log k
(
r∗i − r∗i−1
)
.
Lemma 13.
∑K
j=1 |π1j(x)− π1j(y)| = 1log kr∗1.
Proof. It is easy to see that r′1 = 0 because y itself is a query point and r∗1 = r1 = d(x,Q). Note that for
every j, S1j equals the set of query points. So we always have d(x, S1j) = d(x,Q) = r∗1 and d(y, S1j) = 0.
Therefore, |π1j(x)− π1j(y)| = 1K log kr∗1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ K , and summing up completes the proof.
By Lemma 12 and union bound, with probability at least 1− 1
n2k
, we have
K∑
j=1
|πij(x)− πij(y)| ≥ 1
32 log k
(
r∗i − r∗i−1
)
for all 1 < i ≤ i′. By Lemma 13 we have
K∑
j=1
|π1j(x)− π1j(y)| ≥ 1
log k
r∗1 .
Summing them up we get that
log k∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
|πij(x)− πij(y)| ≥ 1
32 log k
r∗i′ ≥
1
64 log k
d(x, y) .
As a corollary of Theorem 11 and union bound we have
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Corollary 14. In the embedding given in Figure 3, with probability at least 1− 1n , we have that for any data
point x ∈ D and any query points y,
1
64 log k
d(x, y) ≤ ‖π(x)− π(y)‖1 ≤ d(x, y) .
Hence, there exists an embedding of an arbitrary metric to an ℓ1 metric with distortion O(log k) that is
1-sensitive because it is oblivious to the data points. The dimension of the resulting ℓ1 metric is O(log2 k+
log k log n). We remark that the expansion guarantee may fail with some small probability, in which case
the diameter of our embedding may be greater than 1. This would appear to require us to move to an
(ǫ, δ)-privacy guarantee, but it does not: when computing ℓ1 distances between points x, y, we can instead
compute min(1, |π(x) − π(y)|1). In the high probability event in which the expansion guarantee of the
embedding holds, this will be exactly equal to the true distance between the embeddings of the points x and
y. In the small probability event in which the expansion guarantee fails, the resulting queries will remain
1/n sensitive in the private data. So by combining Theorem 7, Theorem 8, and Theorem 11 we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 15. For any metric space (X , d), there is a non-interactive mechanism running in time poly(n, k)
for releasing answers to any k distance queries with respect to (X , d) that is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private,
such that with high probability it answers every query y ∈ Q with accuracy
O
(
1
log k
)
1
n
∑
x∈D
d(x, y)− O˜
(
1
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
≤M (X ,d)ǫ,δ (y)
≤ 1
n
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) + O˜
(
1
n4/5ǫ4/5
)
.
There is also a non-interactive mechanism running in time poly(n, k) for releasing answers to any k distance
queries with respect to (X , d) that is ǫ-differentially private, such that with high probability it answers every
query y ∈ Q with accuracy
O
(
1
log k
)∑
x∈D
d(x, y)− O˜
(
1
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
≤M (X ,d)ǫ (y)
≤
∑
x∈D
d(x, y) + O˜
(
1
n2/3ǫ2/3
)
.
Remark 15.1. Note that in this theorem, we require a dependence on k both in the running time and in the
accuracy bounds. This is because the embedding itself is a function of all of the queries in the query class.
This is also what requires us to restrict attention to the non-interactive setting.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that distance queries defined over an arbitrary metric can be privately answered using ef-
ficient algorithms, circumventing known hardness results for less structured classes of linear queries. Our
techniques crucially leveraged the metric structure of the queries, through our reliance on metric embed-
dings. Identifying other kinds of query structure that can be used to design efficient private query release
algorithms remains one of the most important directions in differential privacy.
Towards this goal, we make a concrete conjecture. Let X = [0, 1]ℓ be the ℓ-dimensional unit rectangle
endowed with the Euclidean norm, and let S ⊆ {φ : [0, 1]ℓ → [0, 1]} be the collection of predicates such
that for each φ ∈ S:
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1. φ is 1-Lipschitz: for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]ℓ, |φ(x)− φ(y)| ≤ ||x− y||2
2. φ is convex: for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]ℓ and for all t ∈ [0, 1], φ(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤ tφ(x) + (1− t)φ(y)
For each φ ∈ S, define the query fφ(D) = 1n
∑
x∈D φ(x). Then:
Conjecture. Let C = {fφ : φ ∈ S} denote the set of 1-Lipschitz, convex linear queries defined over the
universe X = [0, 1]ℓ. There is a differentially private query release mechanism operating in the interactive
setting, that can answer any subset of k queries from C to additive error O˜(poly(ℓ, log(k))/√n) with
per-query update time poly(ℓ, n).
Note that distance queries are a subset of convex, Lipschitz queries. Showing efficient algorithms for
this entire set of queries would be an important step forwards towards the agenda of understanding the
limitations of polynomial time private query release. We remark that if we remove the Lipschitz condition
(and consider instead the class of all convex queries), then this class includes boolean conjunctions, which
is already a challenge problem for efficient private query release. With the Lipschitz condition, this question
is disjoint from (and possibly easier than) the question of efficiently releasing conjunctions.
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